# Sample receipt

> A real signed receipt, field by field: what each part binds, how to verify it, and what a valid signature does and does not establish.

A receipt is what a verification leaves behind. It binds the work, the evidence, the
policy and the verdict into one document, hashes that document canonically, and signs
the hash. Its purpose is that you do not have to trust the machine that produced it.

The document below is the **real release receipt** shipped in the Excellent
repository. It is synthetic release evidence rather than a customer's codebase, but it
is genuine output of the receipt pipeline, with a genuine signature.

**Its verdict is `FAIL`, and we show it on purpose.** The release had fifteen gates,
listed in `checkResultIds`. Ten passed. Three failed (`G01`, `G02`, `G13`), one was
still running (`G09`) and one was blocked by something outside the system (`G12`).
With gates failing, the release verdict is `FAIL`. We publish the receipt as it was
issued rather than picking a flattering one, because that is what a receipt is for: it
records the verdict that was reached. A valid signature proves the document has not
been altered. It does not make the verdict a good one.

## The document

```json
{
  "schemaVersion": 1,
  "serviceVersion": "2026-08-16.v1",
  "receipt": {
    "schemaVersion": 1,
    "id": "receipt_v0_release_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
    "tenantId": "tenant_v0_release",
    "runId": "run_v0_release_e44941560b9f",
    "parentReceiptId": null,
    "status": "FAIL",
    "checkResultIds": [
      "G00:PASS",
      "G01:FAILING",
      "G02:FAILING",
      "G03:PASS",
      "G04:PASS",
      "G05:PASS",
      "G06:PASS",
      "G07:PASS",
      "G08:PASS",
      "G09:RUNNING",
      "G10:PASS",
      "G11:PASS",
      "G12:BLOCKED_EXTERNAL",
      "G13:FAILING",
      "G14:PASS"
    ],
    "evidenceHashes": [
      "sha256:437284d411f1a9fc3aebf0050317c4eb7bf6fb17db85c683713237b307e52ee3",
      "sha256:3b9aed882a0f9ba291fb1a76739fc1fc6b6352746619be9d0eb83cb64d7859fe",
      "sha256:405989c4e96fc8cc1121b4ea331f9a7d72daa959e07748f85c608a58957547bd",
      "sha256:2ef2a674ded9b95de4e77ff8785a0470e00c8043cd3b3ca68013557463c8e583",
      "sha256:93bfdab20f663dc0a0f32740c66a5f0df4c31a471e2fa3751e76be001d506491"
    ],
    "policyVersionRefs": [
      "policy_v0_release@2026.08"
    ],
    "engineVersion": "v0-release@1",
    "issuedAt": "2026-09-16T12:37:22.257Z",
    "signature": {
      "keyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
      "algorithm": "ed25519",
      "value": "ed25519:COSkZ5UROiogqWwpWE6S9QfoQz5kdH8MTvmP6huRA25sqn3oO4lsgPpAEZxsVCLNpH2Pz2Cy6Nd9iv04x2LiCw"
    }
  },
  "binding": {
    "predicate": "excellent.verification.agent-work-receipt.v1",
    "workItemId": "work_cand_9b618ed027764ef4bccf2a64_df-001",
    "workSnapshotId": "wsnap_work_cand_9b618ed027764ef4bccf2a64_df-001",
    "attemptId": "promo_23247c38c4574c96893c2036:release",
    "contractId": "verification-api/2026-08-16.v1",
    "evidenceSnapshotId": "evsnap_v0_release_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
    "evidenceGraphDigest": "sha256:c4395399c0c283d4f36877228b5de86860e8c39f0923e4c7401592f3781ef68f",
    "obligationResultIds": [
      "obligation_lift_lcb_met",
      "obligation_no_hard_gate_regression",
      "obligation_offline_receipt_verifies"
    ],
    "evaluatorRefs": [
      "evaluator:evidence-integrity",
      "evaluator:paired-bootstrap",
      "evaluator:release-gate-audit"
    ],
    "determinationId": "determination_v0_release_FAIL_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
    "validityStateId": "validity_v0_release",
    "enforcementDecisionId": "enforcement_promote_promo_23247c38c4574c96893c2036",
    "enforcementEffectIds": [
      "effect_promotion_promo_23247c38c4574c96893c2036",
      "effect_release_proof_recorded"
    ],
    "reviewDecisionIds": [
      "review_approval_release-approver"
    ],
    "outcomeObservationIds": [
      "outc_e970c8c1732b49ca9d510c5f"
    ],
    "auditEventIds": [
      "audit_v0_release_issue"
    ],
    "buildRef": "sha256:405989c4e96fc8cc1121b4ea331f9a7d72daa959e07748f85c608a58957547bd",
    "subject": {
      "treeHash": "git-tree:fcd3f669b7d3a9a46469e18a7959cc14ea17b65d",
      "commitSha": "commit:e44941560b9fe6713d82ec2d0573eb54983877c0",
      "buildId": "build:v0-release-e44941560b9f",
      "imageDigest": "sha256:e09f241b4fe78ae9d769e0d3c3caaab5",
      "tenantId": "tenant_v0_release",
      "environmentId": "env_local_release_probe",
      "policyDigest": "policy_v0_release@2026.08"
    },
    "sourceCommit": "e44941560b9fe6713d82ec2d0573eb54983877c0",
    "buildDigest": "sha256:405989c4e96fc8cc1121b4ea331f9a7d72daa959e07748f85c608a58957547bd",
    "uiBundleDigest": "sha256:2ef2a674ded9b95de4e77ff8785a0470e00c8043cd3b3ca68013557463c8e583",
    "databaseSchemaVersion": "1052",
    "contractSchemaVersion": "verification-api/2026-08-16.v1",
    "cliArtifactDigest": "sha256:93bfdab20f663dc0a0f32740c66a5f0df4c31a471e2fa3751e76be001d506491",
    "experimentId": "exp_1094686b4cef40bca465ffb6",
    "candidateId": "cand_9b618ed027764ef4bccf2a64",
    "baselineCandidateId": "cand_5a509ab3c2024bd689b83fb4",
    "agentVersionId": "agentver_76d967647cdb4aca9a871f08",
    "baselineAgentVersionId": "agentver_8296005ce5cb4a6fb01f27be",
    "taskDistributionId": "taskdist_13fa273bfe104d1bbe3b061b",
    "promotionId": "promo_23247c38c4574c96893c2036",
    "promotionReceiptId": "receipt_promo_4fcc27f3404047806e786bf3",
    "releaseWorkItemId": "work_cand_9b618ed027764ef4bccf2a64_df-001",
    "comparison": {
      "comparisonId": "cmp_36cc7f27914849a0a9dab20f",
      "observedLiftPct": 25,
      "lcb": 15.625,
      "methodVersion": "paired-bootstrap/v1",
      "pairsCount": 32,
      "stats": {
        "lcb": 15.625,
        "observedLiftPct": 25
      },
      "holdoutPairsCount": 32,
      "hardGateRegressions": []
    },
    "profilesTested": [
      "embedded",
      "local",
      "digitalocean-sandbox",
      "digitalocean-live"
    ],
    "interfacesTested": [
      "rest",
      "cli",
      "mcp",
      "browser",
      "webhook",
      "worker"
    ],
    "testsSummary": {
      "suites": 58,
      "failures": 5
    },
    "approvals": [
      {
        "approver": "release-approver",
        "method": "explicit",
        "decidedAt": "2026-09-16T12:37:22.190Z"
      }
    ],
    "deployment": {
      "localStackProbe": "unavailable(no passing local-stack gate)",
      "digitaloceanSandbox": "unavailable(no passing digitalocean-sandbox gate)",
      "digitaloceanLive": "unavailable(no passing digitalocean-live gate note)"
    },
    "knownOutcomes": [
      {
        "status": "verified"
      }
    ]
  },
  "payloadHash": "sha256:ea48ebc0c36dced1cefd90ae750220594dd2e3124cc67c6ecb9ac524a2b55ca9",
  "signature": {
    "keyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
    "algorithm": "ed25519",
    "value": "ed25519:COSkZ5UROiogqWwpWE6S9QfoQz5kdH8MTvmP6huRA25sqn3oO4lsgPpAEZxsVCLNpH2Pz2Cy6Nd9iv04x2LiCw"
  },
  "publicVerification": {
    "algorithm": "sha256",
    "payloadHash": "sha256:ea48ebc0c36dced1cefd90ae750220594dd2e3124cc67c6ecb9ac524a2b55ca9",
    "signatureAlgorithm": "ed25519",
    "keyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
    "receiptId": "receipt_v0_release_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
    "runId": "run_v0_release_e44941560b9f",
    "tenantId": "tenant_v0_release",
    "issuedAt": "2026-09-16T12:37:22.257Z",
    "parentReceiptId": null
  }
}
```

## What each part is for

**`receipt`** is the verdict itself. `status` is one of the six verification states.
`checkResultIds` names every check that was folded into it, `evidenceHashes` pins the
evidence those checks read, and `policyVersionRefs` pins the policy version they were
judged under. `parentReceiptId` is null here; on a re-verification it points at the
receipt this one supersedes, because receipts are append-only and a verdict is never
edited in place.

**`binding`** is the part that makes the verdict mean something. It names the exact
work item, attempt, contract and evidence snapshot, plus `evaluatorRefs`
(which evaluators decided) and `subject`, which pins the artifact: a git tree hash, a commit,
a build id, an image digest, an environment. Without the binding, a `PASS` is a verdict
about nothing in particular.

**`payloadHash`** is `sha256:` plus the hex sha256 of the canonical JSON of a fixed
field list. Canonical means object keys sorted with `localeCompare`, no whitespace, and
undefined-valued keys omitted. The profile is `excellent.canonical-json.v1`: non-finite
numbers are rejected and timestamps require an RFC 3339 offset.

**`signature`** is Ed25519 over the ASCII bytes of that `payloadHash` string,
base64url-encoded behind an `ed25519:` prefix. Ed25519 is the authoritative algorithm.
Older HMAC receipts remain verifiable, but only as legacy read-only records: an HMAC
key cannot be upgraded into an Ed25519 key by self-declaration.

**`publicVerification`** restates what a third party needs in order to check the
signature without parsing the rest.

## Verifying it

**Anyone can run the public verifier.** [Receipt format](https://www.excellent.so/docs/receipt-format) serves
a zero-dependency verifier, an example receipt pack and its public key from this site,
with the three `curl` commands and the real output. That is the check to run if you do
not have the Excellent source. It takes a receipt *pack* (the envelope plus its trust
root and ledger anchor), so it does not accept this bare envelope: point it at the
example pack, or at a pack of your own.

**This exact receipt needs an Excellent monorepo checkout.** The monorepo's source is
not public; the commands below are for people who already have a checkout. Its
standalone verifier checks this document against the shipped public key. Copy the
verifier, receipt and key somewhere outside the repo (being outside is the point) and
run it there:

```sh
mkdir /tmp/receipt-check && cd /tmp/receipt-check
cp <repo>/scripts/lib/offline-receipt-verifier.mjs .
cp <repo>/docs/v0/release-receipt.json .
cp <repo>/docs/v0/release-receipt-public-key.pem .
node offline-receipt-verifier.mjs release-receipt.json release-receipt-public-key.pem
```

Replace `<repo>` with the path to your Excellent monorepo checkout. The real output is:

```json
{
  "bound": true,
  "receiptId": "receipt_v0_release_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
  "tenantId": "tenant_v0_release",
  "decisionDisclosure": "UNDISCLOSED",
  "claimedKeyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
  "claimedSignatureAlgorithm": "ed25519",
  "signatureAlgorithm": "ed25519",
  "payloadHashMatches": true,
  "signatureValid": true,
  "excellentReachable": false,
  "excellentResolutionError": "ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND",
  …
}
```

The omitted fields are `decidedBy`, `predicateStatus`, `undecidedReasonCode`,
`recomputedPayloadHash`, `tamperedSignatureRejected`, `tamperedContentRejected`, and
`cwd`. `excellentReachable: false` means the standalone verifier did not load Excellent
to get its answer.

The shipped tampered fixture changes the receipt but retains its original hash and
signature. Copy it into that outside directory and run the verifier against it:

```sh
cp <repo>/docs/v0/adversary/receipt-tamper-fixtures/tampered-receipt.json .
node offline-receipt-verifier.mjs tampered-receipt.json release-receipt-public-key.pem
```

The verifier reports:

```json
{ "bound": false, "receiptId": null, "tenantId": null, …,
  "claimed": { "receiptId": "receipt_exp_v0_proof_cand_v0_proof", … },
  "claimedKeyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
  "payloadHashMatches": false,
  "signatureValid": false,
  "tamperedSignatureRejected": true,
  "tamperedContentRejected": true }
```

When the receipt is not bound, its identity and decision fields are `null`; the
unverified envelope values appear under `claimed`. The verifier exits 0 when it
reaches an answer, including a negative one, and exits 2 only when it cannot reach
a verdict. Read the JSON booleans rather than treating exit 0 as a passing receipt.

## What a valid signature does and does not establish

A valid signature means the receipt has not been altered since the holder of that key
signed it. That is tamper-evidence, and it is real.

It does **not** establish that the key is the tenant's key. If you obtained the key from
the same system that issued the verdict, a forged receipt re-signed under an attacker's
key verifies exactly as cleanly as a genuine one. Confirm the key's fingerprint through
a channel this system does not control, then pin it. That is what `--pubkey` is for.

Fetch a tenant's published trust material with:

```bash
excellent-mcp verification universal-trust-root --json
```

## Related

- [Receipt format](https://www.excellent.so/docs/receipt-format): the JSON Schema for the whole pack, and a verifier you can download and run yourself.
- [How verification decides](https://www.excellent.so/docs/how-verification-decides): what has to be true before a receipt can say `PASS`, and why one failing check is enough for `FAIL`.
- [Receipts](https://www.excellent.so/docs/receipts): the short version.
- [CLI reference](https://www.excellent.so/docs/cli): `excellent-mcp receipt verify` flags and exit codes.

Source: https://www.excellent.so/docs/sample-receipt
