Sample receipt
A real signed receipt, field by field: what each part binds, how to verify it, and what a valid signature does and does not establish.
On this page
A receipt is what a verification leaves behind. It binds the work, the evidence, the policy and the verdict into one document, hashes that document canonically, and signs the hash. Its purpose is that you do not have to trust the machine that produced it.
The document below is the real release receipt shipped in the Excellent repository. It is synthetic release evidence rather than a customer's codebase, but it is genuine output of the receipt pipeline, with a genuine signature.
Its verdict is FAIL, and we show it on purpose. The release had fifteen gates,
listed in checkResultIds. Ten passed. Three failed (G01, G02, G13), one was
still running (G09) and one was blocked by something outside the system (G12).
With gates failing, the release verdict is FAIL. We publish the receipt as it was
issued rather than picking a flattering one, because that is what a receipt is for: it
records the verdict that was reached. A valid signature proves the document has not
been altered. It does not make the verdict a good one.
The document
{
"schemaVersion": 1,
"serviceVersion": "2026-08-16.v1",
"receipt": {
"schemaVersion": 1,
"id": "receipt_v0_release_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
"tenantId": "tenant_v0_release",
"runId": "run_v0_release_e44941560b9f",
"parentReceiptId": null,
"status": "FAIL",
"checkResultIds": [
"G00:PASS",
"G01:FAILING",
"G02:FAILING",
"G03:PASS",
"G04:PASS",
"G05:PASS",
"G06:PASS",
"G07:PASS",
"G08:PASS",
"G09:RUNNING",
"G10:PASS",
"G11:PASS",
"G12:BLOCKED_EXTERNAL",
"G13:FAILING",
"G14:PASS"
],
"evidenceHashes": [
"sha256:437284d411f1a9fc3aebf0050317c4eb7bf6fb17db85c683713237b307e52ee3",
"sha256:3b9aed882a0f9ba291fb1a76739fc1fc6b6352746619be9d0eb83cb64d7859fe",
"sha256:405989c4e96fc8cc1121b4ea331f9a7d72daa959e07748f85c608a58957547bd",
"sha256:2ef2a674ded9b95de4e77ff8785a0470e00c8043cd3b3ca68013557463c8e583",
"sha256:93bfdab20f663dc0a0f32740c66a5f0df4c31a471e2fa3751e76be001d506491"
],
"policyVersionRefs": [
"policy_v0_release@2026.08"
],
"engineVersion": "v0-release@1",
"issuedAt": "2026-09-16T12:37:22.257Z",
"signature": {
"keyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"value": "ed25519:COSkZ5UROiogqWwpWE6S9QfoQz5kdH8MTvmP6huRA25sqn3oO4lsgPpAEZxsVCLNpH2Pz2Cy6Nd9iv04x2LiCw"
}
},
"binding": {
"predicate": "excellent.verification.agent-work-receipt.v1",
"workItemId": "work_cand_9b618ed027764ef4bccf2a64_df-001",
"workSnapshotId": "wsnap_work_cand_9b618ed027764ef4bccf2a64_df-001",
"attemptId": "promo_23247c38c4574c96893c2036:release",
"contractId": "verification-api/2026-08-16.v1",
"evidenceSnapshotId": "evsnap_v0_release_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
"evidenceGraphDigest": "sha256:c4395399c0c283d4f36877228b5de86860e8c39f0923e4c7401592f3781ef68f",
"obligationResultIds": [
"obligation_lift_lcb_met",
"obligation_no_hard_gate_regression",
"obligation_offline_receipt_verifies"
],
"evaluatorRefs": [
"evaluator:evidence-integrity",
"evaluator:paired-bootstrap",
"evaluator:release-gate-audit"
],
"determinationId": "determination_v0_release_FAIL_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
"validityStateId": "validity_v0_release",
"enforcementDecisionId": "enforcement_promote_promo_23247c38c4574c96893c2036",
"enforcementEffectIds": [
"effect_promotion_promo_23247c38c4574c96893c2036",
"effect_release_proof_recorded"
],
"reviewDecisionIds": [
"review_approval_release-approver"
],
"outcomeObservationIds": [
"outc_e970c8c1732b49ca9d510c5f"
],
"auditEventIds": [
"audit_v0_release_issue"
],
"buildRef": "sha256:405989c4e96fc8cc1121b4ea331f9a7d72daa959e07748f85c608a58957547bd",
"subject": {
"treeHash": "git-tree:fcd3f669b7d3a9a46469e18a7959cc14ea17b65d",
"commitSha": "commit:e44941560b9fe6713d82ec2d0573eb54983877c0",
"buildId": "build:v0-release-e44941560b9f",
"imageDigest": "sha256:e09f241b4fe78ae9d769e0d3c3caaab5",
"tenantId": "tenant_v0_release",
"environmentId": "env_local_release_probe",
"policyDigest": "policy_v0_release@2026.08"
},
"sourceCommit": "e44941560b9fe6713d82ec2d0573eb54983877c0",
"buildDigest": "sha256:405989c4e96fc8cc1121b4ea331f9a7d72daa959e07748f85c608a58957547bd",
"uiBundleDigest": "sha256:2ef2a674ded9b95de4e77ff8785a0470e00c8043cd3b3ca68013557463c8e583",
"databaseSchemaVersion": "1052",
"contractSchemaVersion": "verification-api/2026-08-16.v1",
"cliArtifactDigest": "sha256:93bfdab20f663dc0a0f32740c66a5f0df4c31a471e2fa3751e76be001d506491",
"experimentId": "exp_1094686b4cef40bca465ffb6",
"candidateId": "cand_9b618ed027764ef4bccf2a64",
"baselineCandidateId": "cand_5a509ab3c2024bd689b83fb4",
"agentVersionId": "agentver_76d967647cdb4aca9a871f08",
"baselineAgentVersionId": "agentver_8296005ce5cb4a6fb01f27be",
"taskDistributionId": "taskdist_13fa273bfe104d1bbe3b061b",
"promotionId": "promo_23247c38c4574c96893c2036",
"promotionReceiptId": "receipt_promo_4fcc27f3404047806e786bf3",
"releaseWorkItemId": "work_cand_9b618ed027764ef4bccf2a64_df-001",
"comparison": {
"comparisonId": "cmp_36cc7f27914849a0a9dab20f",
"observedLiftPct": 25,
"lcb": 15.625,
"methodVersion": "paired-bootstrap/v1",
"pairsCount": 32,
"stats": {
"lcb": 15.625,
"observedLiftPct": 25
},
"holdoutPairsCount": 32,
"hardGateRegressions": []
},
"profilesTested": [
"embedded",
"local",
"digitalocean-sandbox",
"digitalocean-live"
],
"interfacesTested": [
"rest",
"cli",
"mcp",
"browser",
"webhook",
"worker"
],
"testsSummary": {
"suites": 58,
"failures": 5
},
"approvals": [
{
"approver": "release-approver",
"method": "explicit",
"decidedAt": "2026-09-16T12:37:22.190Z"
}
],
"deployment": {
"localStackProbe": "unavailable(no passing local-stack gate)",
"digitaloceanSandbox": "unavailable(no passing digitalocean-sandbox gate)",
"digitaloceanLive": "unavailable(no passing digitalocean-live gate note)"
},
"knownOutcomes": [
{
"status": "verified"
}
]
},
"payloadHash": "sha256:ea48ebc0c36dced1cefd90ae750220594dd2e3124cc67c6ecb9ac524a2b55ca9",
"signature": {
"keyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
"algorithm": "ed25519",
"value": "ed25519:COSkZ5UROiogqWwpWE6S9QfoQz5kdH8MTvmP6huRA25sqn3oO4lsgPpAEZxsVCLNpH2Pz2Cy6Nd9iv04x2LiCw"
},
"publicVerification": {
"algorithm": "sha256",
"payloadHash": "sha256:ea48ebc0c36dced1cefd90ae750220594dd2e3124cc67c6ecb9ac524a2b55ca9",
"signatureAlgorithm": "ed25519",
"keyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
"receiptId": "receipt_v0_release_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
"runId": "run_v0_release_e44941560b9f",
"tenantId": "tenant_v0_release",
"issuedAt": "2026-09-16T12:37:22.257Z",
"parentReceiptId": null
}
}What each part is for
receipt is the verdict itself. status is one of the six verification states.
checkResultIds names every check that was folded into it, evidenceHashes pins the
evidence those checks read, and policyVersionRefs pins the policy version they were
judged under. parentReceiptId is null here; on a re-verification it points at the
receipt this one supersedes, because receipts are append-only and a verdict is never
edited in place.
binding is the part that makes the verdict mean something. It names the exact
work item, attempt, contract and evidence snapshot, plus evaluatorRefs
(which evaluators decided) and subject, which pins the artifact: a git tree hash, a commit,
a build id, an image digest, an environment. Without the binding, a PASS is a verdict
about nothing in particular.
payloadHash is sha256: plus the hex sha256 of the canonical JSON of a fixed
field list. Canonical means object keys sorted with localeCompare, no whitespace, and
undefined-valued keys omitted. The profile is excellent.canonical-json.v1: non-finite
numbers are rejected and timestamps require an RFC 3339 offset.
signature is Ed25519 over the ASCII bytes of that payloadHash string,
base64url-encoded behind an ed25519: prefix. Ed25519 is the authoritative algorithm.
Older HMAC receipts remain verifiable, but only as legacy read-only records: an HMAC
key cannot be upgraded into an Ed25519 key by self-declaration.
publicVerification restates what a third party needs in order to check the
signature without parsing the rest.
Verifying it
Anyone can run the public verifier. Receipt format serves
a zero-dependency verifier, an example receipt pack and its public key from this site,
with the three curl commands and the real output. That is the check to run if you do
not have the Excellent source. It takes a receipt pack (the envelope plus its trust
root and ledger anchor), so it does not accept this bare envelope: point it at the
example pack, or at a pack of your own.
This exact receipt needs an Excellent monorepo checkout. The monorepo's source is not public; the commands below are for people who already have a checkout. Its standalone verifier checks this document against the shipped public key. Copy the verifier, receipt and key somewhere outside the repo (being outside is the point) and run it there:
mkdir /tmp/receipt-check && cd /tmp/receipt-check
cp <repo>/scripts/lib/offline-receipt-verifier.mjs .
cp <repo>/docs/v0/release-receipt.json .
cp <repo>/docs/v0/release-receipt-public-key.pem .
node offline-receipt-verifier.mjs release-receipt.json release-receipt-public-key.pemReplace <repo> with the path to your Excellent monorepo checkout. The real output is:
{
"bound": true,
"receiptId": "receipt_v0_release_4df3dd89b3e4d0a0",
"tenantId": "tenant_v0_release",
"decisionDisclosure": "UNDISCLOSED",
"claimedKeyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
"claimedSignatureAlgorithm": "ed25519",
"signatureAlgorithm": "ed25519",
"payloadHashMatches": true,
"signatureValid": true,
"excellentReachable": false,
"excellentResolutionError": "ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND",
…
}The omitted fields are decidedBy, predicateStatus, undecidedReasonCode,
recomputedPayloadHash, tamperedSignatureRejected, tamperedContentRejected, and
cwd. excellentReachable: false means the standalone verifier did not load Excellent
to get its answer.
The shipped tampered fixture changes the receipt but retains its original hash and signature. Copy it into that outside directory and run the verifier against it:
cp <repo>/docs/v0/adversary/receipt-tamper-fixtures/tampered-receipt.json .
node offline-receipt-verifier.mjs tampered-receipt.json release-receipt-public-key.pemThe verifier reports:
{ "bound": false, "receiptId": null, "tenantId": null, …,
"claimed": { "receiptId": "receipt_exp_v0_proof_cand_v0_proof", … },
"claimedKeyId": "v0-ed25519-2026-08",
"payloadHashMatches": false,
"signatureValid": false,
"tamperedSignatureRejected": true,
"tamperedContentRejected": true }When the receipt is not bound, its identity and decision fields are null; the
unverified envelope values appear under claimed. The verifier exits 0 when it
reaches an answer, including a negative one, and exits 2 only when it cannot reach
a verdict. Read the JSON booleans rather than treating exit 0 as a passing receipt.
What a valid signature does and does not establish
A valid signature means the receipt has not been altered since the holder of that key signed it. That is tamper-evidence, and it is real.
It does not establish that the key is the tenant's key. If you obtained the key from
the same system that issued the verdict, a forged receipt re-signed under an attacker's
key verifies exactly as cleanly as a genuine one. Confirm the key's fingerprint through
a channel this system does not control, then pin it. That is what --pubkey is for.
Fetch a tenant's published trust material with:
excellent-mcp verification universal-trust-root --jsonRelated
- Receipt format: the JSON Schema for the whole pack, and a verifier you can download and run yourself.
- How verification decides: what has to be true before a receipt can say
PASS, and why one failing check is enough forFAIL. - Receipts: the short version.
- CLI reference:
excellent-mcp receipt verifyflags and exit codes.